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COMMENTS
REFERENDUM ZONING: THE STATE AND
FEDERAL ISSUES AND A SUGGESTED
APPROACH
Changes in zoning regulations are most important to two
groups of people: the community and the individual property
owners. For the community, zoning changes have major impli-
cations on future growth and land use patterns. For the indi-
vidual, the type and intensity of development allowed affects
both the value of the land and who will be able to use it. This
comment examines the applicability of local referendum pow-
ers to the rezoning process.
Referendum zoning presents state law issues regarding the
classification of rezoning actions as legislative or quasi-judicial
functions' and the interpretation of state statutes, as well as
federal equal protection and due process issues. These ques-
tions are particularly significant in view of the widespread in-
terest in local growth control2 and the judicial decisions limit-
ing the use of zoning for exclusionary purposes.3 After a brief
description of the referendum and of the zoning and rezoning
processes, the author will analyze the developing legal contro-
versy over when and whether the referendum process should be
applied to rezoning decisions.
I. BACKGROUND: REFERENDA AND REZONINGS
The referendum and its companion process, the initiative,
provide the electorate with the opportunity to intervene di-
rectly in the legislative process at two different stages. The
initiative is the "initiation of municipal legislation and enact-
ment or rejection thereof by the municipal electorate in the
event the proposed measure is not enacted by their elected
1. See Freilich, Editor's Comments, 6 URBAN LAw. vii n.2 (1974): "The characteri-
zation of 'judicial' is that of the Oregon supreme court. Ordinarily actions of a legisla-
tive body which address a specific set of facts and issuance of a license approval or
permit are denominated 'quasi-judicial,' or 'administrative.'"
2. See Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
3. See, e.g., 59 MARQ. L. REv. 211 (1976).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
representatives." 4 In contrast, the referendum "is the right of
the people to have an act passed by the legislative body sub-
mitted for their approval or rejection." ' 5 Either procedure is
usually begun by members of the electorate who circulate peti-
tions seeking a public vote on a specific issue.' In some instan-
ces, however, a referendum on prespecified issues may be man-
datory.7
In most states both the initiative and referendum powers
have been limited, either by statute or by judicial opinion, to
legislative matters and cannot be invoked when the legislature
is acting in an administrative or quasi-judicial capacity.' This
limitation is particularly important in determining the validity
of referendum zoning since courts are increasingly concerned
with the nonlegislative nature of many rezoning actions.9
Zoning, the most commonly used tool to regulate the use of
land, is based on the police power of the state to protect the
health, safety and general welfare of its citizens. In most
states' enabling legislation provides the legal basis for com-
munity zoning action, and municipal zoning ordinances reflect
the powers granted and the requirements imposed by the state
enabling legislation. Zoning ordinances typically divide the
community into use districts based on residential, commercial
and industrial classifications." Regulations applied to each use
district control the use, height and area of structures within the
district. These regulations are found in the ordinance text,
while the application to specific property is recorded on a com-
munity map delineating the districts.
4. 5 E. McQuILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 16.52 (3d ed. 1969).
5. Id. at § 16.53.
6. Id. at § 16.59.
7. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976);
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
8. 5 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 16.54, 16.55 (3d ed. 1969).
9. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs., 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
10. The state enabling legislation only applies to cities subject to general state law.
California cases provide an excellent example of cities not subject to general state law.
See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Contractors' Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d
570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974).
11. These basic classifications are divided into zones which fit the needs of the
community. For instance, in different residential zones, lot sizes may vary or the zones
may be designated for single family or multi-family use. The commercial classifica-
tions may be further subdivided into general or highway commercial, neighborhood
retail, shopping center, etc., and the industrial classifications may separate light in-
dustrial and heavy industrial uses.
[Vol. 60:907
COMMENTS
The state enabling legislation also provides mechanisms for
zoning changes which may be necessitated by mistake,
changed circumstances or individual hardship. These mecha-
nisms include variances and amendments to the text or map
of the zoning ordinance' This comment will deal with only one
of the mechanisms for change, the zoning amendment, which
will also be referred to as a "rezoning.' 2 Amendments are
usually based upon a determination by the appropriate
governing body of changed circumstances or of mistake in the
original designation and may apply to the community as a
whole or to a specific piece of property.
The provision for zoning amendments found in the Wiscon-
sin Statutes' 3 is representative of state enabling legislation
around the country. Before a zoning ordinance can be
amended, the statute requires review by the planning commis-
sion, public hearings, and approval by a majority of the munic-
ipal legislative body. In addition, if twenty percent of the
landowners or twenty percent of adjacent owners in the area
to be rezoned object, an extraordinary majority of three-
quarters of the legislative body is required to pass the amend-
ment. 4
12. In this article the terms "zoning amendment" and "rezoning" have been used
synonymously. The term "rezoning" may be used to refer only to zoning map amend-
ments. See, e.g., D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND D.VELOPMFNT CONTROL LAW
§ 104 (1971).
13. Wis. STAT. § 62.23(7)(d) (1973) provides in pertinent part:
The council may change the districts and regulations after first submitting the
proposed changes to the city plan commission or board of public land commis-
sioners for recommendation and report and after publishing a class 2 notice,
under ch. 985, of the proposed changes and hearings thereon. At least 10 days'
prior written notice of changes in the district plan shall be given to the clerk of
any municipality whose boundaries are within 1,000 feet of the land to be af-
fected by the proposed change but failure to give such notice shall not invalidate
any such change. The council or committee thereof shall give an opportunity to
any person interested to be heard. In case of a protest against such change, duly
signed and acknowledged by the owners of 20% or more either of the areas of
the land included in such proposed change, or by the owners of 20% or more of
the area of the land immediately adjacent extending 100 feet therefrom, or by
the owners of 20% or more of the land directly opposite thereto extending 100
feet from the street frontage of such opposite land, such amendment shall not
become effective except by the favorable vote of three-fourths of the members
of the council. Notices of such tentative recommendations or proposed changes
in the plan and regulations may contain the street names and house or lot
numbers for purposes of identification if the commission, council or board so
determines.
14. Id. See also D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
LAW §§ 220-21 (1971).
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II. DISCUSSION: STATE AND FEDERAL ISSUES
Most of the litigation regarding the application of the refer-
endum and the initiative to zoning has taken place in the state
courts, although some cases involving equal protection or due
process issues have been decided by the federal courts.' 5 The
basic issues involved in state decisions are: Is rezoning a legis-
lative or a quasi-judicial action? In a conflict between referen-
dum and zoning provisions, which governs? Can statutory no-
tice and hearing requirements be satisfied by an election
process? Should the referendum results, as well as the
referendum procedures, be subject to judicial review?
The question of whether a zoning amendment is a legisla-
tive or a quasi-judicial action has received a great deal of judi-
cial attention, since it may determine the outcome of the case.
The original decision to zone is generally considered a
legislative function, and the granting of variances and special
permits is considered an administrative act; but the functional
classification of zoning amendments is another matter. Many
courts consider all zoning amendments to be legislative acts,"6
but others find this classification to be unrealistic and confin-
ing.' 7 Some courts have distinguished the original policy-
making decision to zone and the actions, including amend-
ment, necessary to implement that decision.
The determination as to whether or not a city desires to em-
bark upon a policy of zoning for the purpose of regulating and
restricting the construction and use of buildings within fixed
areas is a legislative matter subject to referendum. But when
such policy has been determined, the changing of such areas,
or the granting of exceptions, are committed to the mayor
and council as administrative matters in order to secure the
uniformity necessary to the accomplishment of the purposes
of the comprehensive zoning ordinance.'8
15. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), Southern
Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.
1970).
16. See, e.g., Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187,
324 N.E.2d 740 (1975); San Diego Bldg. Contractors' Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d
205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974); Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J.
Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973).
17. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs., 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973);
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972); Bird v. Sorenson,
16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
18. Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, -, 75 N.W.2d 713, 716 (1956).
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Under this analysis, rezonings are nonlegislative actions and
are not usually subject to referenda.
Courts have also distinguished between amendments af-
fecting small parcels of land and more comprehensive amend-
ments affecting the community as a whole.
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a
specific piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative
authority, are subject to limited review, and may only be
attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse
of authority. On the other hand, a determination whether the
permissible use of a specific piece of property should be
changed is usually an exercise of judicial authority and its
propriety is subject to an altogether different test.'9
Thus, the functional classification of rezoning as either a legis-
lative or a nonlegislative act can be determinative of both the
propriety of the initiative and referendum procedures and the
type of judicial review accorded the rezoning decision. A non-
legislative action is not normally subject to initiative and
referendum. Furthermore, even when taken by a legislative
body, it is not accorded the presumption of validity and there-
fore is subject to stricter judicial scrutiny than a legislative
action.
State courts in Connecticut, Nevada, Michigan and Oregon
have determined that under some circumstances, rezonings are
nonlegislative acts to which the referendum power does not
apply. The Connecticut 2 0 and Nevada21 courts have distin-
guished the initial policy-making decision to zone from the
functions, including amendments, necessary to implement
that decision, while the Michigan and Oregon2 courts have
differentiated rezonings of particular parcels from community-
wide rezonings.
Other jurisdictions, most notably Ohio, California and New
Jersey, consider rezonings to be legislative actions. In cases
where the cities are not subject to the general state statutes,
such as home rule cities in Ohio and charter cities in Califor-
19. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs., 264 Or. 574,_, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973).
20. O'Merara v. City of Norwich, 167 Conn. 579, 356 A.2d 906 (1975).
21. Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234
(1973).
22. West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974).
23. Allison v. Washington County, 24 Or. App. 571, 548 P.2d 188 (1976)
[comprehensive rezoning to which referendum would apply].
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nia,24 these courts are faced with the constitutional question of
whether equal protection or due process guarantees are violated
by referendum zoning. The federal constitutional issues will be
discussed later in this comment. In most cases the classifica-
tion of rezonings as legislative actions raises the issue of
whether the statutes governing referenda are compatible with
those governing rezonings.
In dealing with general law cities, which unlike charter ci-
ties are subject to general state statutes such as the zoning
enabling act, California has concluded that the initiative pro-
cess bypasses and is incompatible with the zoning enabling
statute. However, since the referendum vote occurs after the
rezoning proposal has been through the procedures mandated
by the zoning statute, the California courts have held that the
referendum is simply an additional step in the zoning amend-
ment process, and that there is no problem of statutory con-
flict.25 Arizona 2 has also adopted this "additional step" ration-
ale.
24. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); San Diego
Bldg. Contractors' Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr.
146 (1974).
25. Since 1929, when the California Supreme Court decided Hurst v. City of Bur-
lingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 508 (1929), the power of initiative has been considered
inapplicable to the adoption of zoning ordinances in general law cities which are
subject to the state zoning act. Two basic reasons for that decision were: (1) since the
city's legislative body would not have the capacity to enact a zoning law without
compliance with the state statute, the power of the electorate acting in the same
legislative capacity is similarly circumscribed, and (2) where two laws are hopelessly
inconsistent, the special statute dealing with a particular subject is controlling over
the general statute.
In distinguishing the initiative and referendum powers, Hurst pointed the way for
the 1958 decision of Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958),
which ruled that rezoning actions by the legislative body are appropriately submitted
to referendum for approval or disapproval.
26. See City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968);
Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai County Board of Supervisors, 108 Ariz.
449, 501 P.2d 391 (1972).
Like the California courts, the Arizona court has distinguished initiative and refer-
enda with regard to zoning amendments. It has determined that initiative is inapplica-
ble to zoning decisions, since it cannot by nature comply satisfactorily with the notice
and hearing requirements. The referendum, on the other hand, occurs only. after all
the procedural requirements of the zoning enabling act have been fulfilled and the
legislative body has voted. It is, therefore, not inconsistent with the enabling legisla-
tion but simply another step in the amendment process.
The Arizona court's distinction is theoretically sound. However, a closer look at the
cases indicates that these distinctions are not really applicable. The City of Scottsdale
case involved an initiative petition to invalidate the rezoning of a 7-1/2 acre parcel from
residential to commercial use, while the Queen Creek case involved the rezoning of
[Vol. 60:907
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New Jersey also recognizes the distinction between
initiative, which completely ignores the rezoning statute, and
the referendum, which imposes a public vote on an action
taken in compliance with the zoning act procedure, but New
Jersey does not accept the additional step thesis. Rather, that
court has concluded that the effects of the initiative and refer-
endum in rezoning cases are sufficiently similar to apply the
same rules and that, as applied to rezonings, both are invalid
since they would render meaningless the procedural safeguards
of the zoning statute. 2
Zoning enabling statutes typically contain notice and hear-
ing provisions which are similar to the notice and hearing re-
quirements of procedural due process. The basic notice and
hearing issue in referendum zoning cases is whether the statu-
tory requirements can be reconciled with initiative and referen-
dum procedures. The courts have concluded that because the
initiative ignores the established statutory procedures for en-
acting or amending legislation, the initiative procedure cannot
comply with these statutory requirements, and consequently
the more specific zoning statute should govern. The courts are
more divided on the issue of whether the referendum procedure
is compatible with the statutory requirements. 2s The potential
conflict between the procedural requirements of zoning stat-
utes and the initiative and referendum procedures presents
questions of statutory compatibility, not of whether referen-
dum zoning meets constitutional due process requirements of
fundamental fairness.
A careful analysis of the facts of a case in light of state law
may make inquiry into constitutional questions unnecessary.
For instance, if the rezoning is classified as a nonlegislative
action, the referendum is inappropriate; if the rezoning is con-
sidered a legislative action, the court must determine whether
the initiative and referendum powers are compatible with the
zoning power, and, if a conflict exists, which power takes pre-
about 3,840 acres, in company ownership, to permit a major mixed use development
followed by a petition for a referendum. The cases should not be distinguished by the
name given to the electoral procedure. In essence, both were referenda. The real dis-
tinction between the cases seems to be in the size and type of development authorized
by the rezoning.
27. Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973);
Smith v. Township of Livingston, 106 N.J. Super. 444, 256 A.2d 85 (1969).
28. Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973);
Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958).
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cedence. However, if the state law issues are resolved in favor
of the referendum, inquiry into constitutional equal protection
and due process issues is necessary. Although state constitu-
tions may contain similar provisions, federal constitutional law
is usually relied upon in determining the equal protection and
due process issues.
The constitutional issues of equal protection and due pro-
cess arise from the limitations placed by the fourteenth amend-
ment on state powers. 9 As applied to rezonings, these issues
have been litigated in two recent federal cases, Southern Ala-
meda Spanish Speaking Organization (SASSO) v. City of
Union City3" and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc.
31
SASSO involved a rezoning for multi-family residential
development which was nullified by a referendum. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the effects of a referendum
abrogating a rezoning could be so discriminatory with regard
to the proposed class of users of the property as to violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. How-
ever, the court did not find sufficient evidence of discrimina-
tion to warrant the injunctive relief sought. The court applied
an interpretation of the equal protection clause which the Su-
preme Court developed in the 1960's. Essentially, this interpre-
tation held that if the effects of the legislation are sufficiently
discriminatory, the law will be held to deny equal protection,
even though a discriminatory intent has not been found. 32 Later
Supreme Court decisions retreated from this interpretation of
the equal protection clause, 33 and most recently the Court has
voiced its dissatisfaction with the "effects" doctrine.34 Thus,
the federal courts are now unlikely to consider the discrimina-
tory effects of legislation which is not discriminatory on its
face, even in the limited manner that the Ninth Circuit did in
SASSO.
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV: "No state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
30. 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
31. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
32. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
33. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
34. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 45 U.S.L.W.
4073, 4077 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
[Vol. 60:907
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The SASSO court decided the due process as well as the
equal protection issue, concluding that while the legislature
must balance neighbors' preferences in a rezoning case with the
public interest, a referendum "is far more than an expression
of ambiguously founded neighborhood preference. It is. . . an
exercise by the voters of their traditional right through direct
legislation to override the views of their elected representatives
as to what best serves the public interest. '35 The court also
concluded that the result of the referendum was not "such an
arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the zoning power as to be
violative of [SASSO's] right to due process of law."3 This
lower court determination foreshadowed the Supreme Court's
decision in Eastlake.
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,31 the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme
Court's determination 3 that a mandatory referendum provi-
sion in the city charter violated federal due process guarantees.
The case involved the rezoning of an eight-acre parcel from
industrial to multi-family high rise use. Between the time of
the initial rezoning application and the official amendment of
the zoning ordinance, the voters adopted an initiative measure
requiring fifty-five percent voter approval of all land use
changes. Pursuant to this new requirement, the rezoning pro-
posal was submitted to the voters and failed to receive the
required measure of approval. The Ohio Supreme Court, classi-
fying the zoning amendment as a legislative act, found that the
mandatory referendum was an unlawful delegation of legisla-
tive authority which violated the due process protections of the
fourteenth amendment.39 A majority of the Ohio court also
35. 424 F.2d at 294.
36. Id.
37. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
38. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d
740 (1975).
39. Due process of law requires that procedures for the exercise of municipal
power be structured such that fundamental choices among competing municipal
policies are resolved by a responsible organ of government. It also requires that
a municipality protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of municipal
power, by assuring that the fundamental policy choices underlying the exercise
of that power are articulated by some responsible organ of government. ...
The Eastlake charter provision ignored these concepts and blatantly delegated
legislative authority, with no assurance that the result reached thereby would
be reasonable or rational.
Id. at 746.
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joined in the concurring opinion which focused on the possible
discriminatory effects of the mandatory referendum. 0
The United States Supreme Court found the initiative and
referendum to be a reservation, rather than a delegation, of
power to the people and that the requirement of discernible
standards in the delegation of powers was not applicable. The
Court held that the referendum process does not violate due
process, although an arbitrary and capricious result bearing no
relation to police power objectives would be open to challenge
in state courts on both state law and fourteenth amendment
grounds.4
Mr. Justice Powell 2 argued that the referendum procedure
in Eastlake was fundamentally unfair. In a separate dissent
Mr. Justice Stevens,13 joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, also at-
tacked the referendum procedure as fundamentally unfair, but
went further to examine the nature of the rezoning process and
the majority's inference that due process guarantees do not
extend to legislative actions. Justice Stevens argued that the
"'legislative' label should not save an otherwise invalid pro-
cess."44 His dissent also cogently argued that the special nature
of the zoning process, which involves an adjudication of the
rights of individual property owners, makes it subject to due
process protections. This argument goes to the heart of both the
constitutional and functional classification issues.
4 5
40. Id. at 748.
41. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
42. Id. at 680.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 686.
45. The complexity of the issues dealt with in the dissent makes the reasoning
difficult to follow at times. Justice Stevens's points, however, are provocative. A few
of these points will be quoted, but the dissent is best read in its entirety, particularly
since his footnotes show a great deal of research and thought. "A zoning code is unlike
other legislation affecting the use of property. The deprivation caused by a zoning code
is customarily qualified by recognizing the property owner's right to apply for an
amendment. . . ... Id. at 682.
I have no doubt about the validity of the initiative or the referendum as an
appropriate method of deciding questions of community policy. I think it is
equally clear that the popular vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating
the rights of individual litigants . . ..
Id. at 693.
Since the ordinance places a manifestly unreasonable obstacle in the path of
every property owner seeking any zoning change, since it provides no standards
or procedures for exempting particular parcels or claims from the referendum
requirement, and since the record contains no justification for the use of the
[Vol. 60:907
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The majority decision in Eastlake effectively eliminates the
argument that referendum zoning procedures violate federal
due process guarantees. However, state due process provisions
can be interpreted differently. This possibility was briefly con-
sidered by the Ohio Supreme Court on remand of the Eastlake
decision. On the record of that case, however, the Ohio court
refrained from imposing different state due process standards,"5
These varying state judicial approaches to the functional
classification of rezoning and the compatibility of zoning and
referendum procedures are representative of those taken by
courts around the country. 7 In those jurisdictions which find
referendum zoning procedurally valid, the referendum results
may nevertheless be challenged as arbitrary and capricious, 8
as having been based on a lack of reasonable information,49 or
on improper motivation." However, the traditional judicial re-
straint in reviewing legislative actions which have any reasona-
ble basis limits critical judicial scrutiny of the referendum re-
sults.
In considering the reasonableness of the referendum result,
the courts may be forced to return again to the requirements
of the zoning enabling statute. For instance, in many jurisdic-
tions the traditional requirement that zoning be in accordance
with a comprehensive plan has been strengthened by recent
legislation5 or by judicial interpretation.12 The comprehensive
plan provides the court with a basis for scrutinizing the reason-
ableness of the rezoning action. However, a referendum result
rejecting a rezoning is unlikely to conflict with the plan if the
original zoning was based on that plan. Similarly, a referen-
dum approving a rezoning is likely to be reasonable in light of
procedure in this case, I am persuaded that we should respect the state judici-
ary's appraisal of the fundamental fairness of this decisionmaking process in this
case.
Id. at 694.
46. Forest City Enterprises v. City of Eastlake, 48 Ohio St. 2d 47, 356 N.E.2d 499,
-, per curiam opinion on remand from U.S. Supreme Court (November 3, 1976).
47. See Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d 1030 (1976); Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d 991 (1976).
48. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
49. Anne Arundel County v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 354 A.2d 788 (1976).
50. Andover Dev. Corp. v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 328 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1976).
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3194 (West Supp. 1976); CAL. Gov'T CODe § 65860 (West
Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-1 - 40:55D-92 (West Supp. 1976) (effective
Aug. 1, 1976).
52. Green v. Hayward, 275 Or. 693, 552 P.2d 815 (1976); Baker v. City of Milwau-
kie, 271 Or. 500, 533 P.2d 772 (1975); City of Erlanger v. Hoff, 535 S.W.2d 86 (Ky.
1976).
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a previously determined change in circumstances or a mistake
in the original zoning or of an already effected change in the
comprehensive plan.
Compatibility with the comprehensive plan is but one stan-
dard for determining the reasonableness of a rezoning and is
not an end in itself. The plan, like the zoning process, is simply
a tool for achieving rational and beneficial land use patterns.
The hidden and disquieting question in the initiative and refer-
endum zoning cases is the motivation of the voters in accepting
or rejecting the rezoning in a referendum election. Over the
past decade several state and federal courts have dealt harshly
with "exclusionary zoning" practices on equal protection
grounds.53 In the context of referendum zoning, however, the
voters' reasons for proposing or rejecting a rezoning are unlikely
to be a matter of public record, and since the present Supreme
Court favors referenda and disfavors the "effects" doctrine,
neither discriminatory motivation nor discriminatory effect are
fruitful areas for an equal protection challenge in the federal
courts.54 The state courts are also unlikely to scrutinize the
voters' motivation or the discriminatory effect of the referen-
dum results, both because of the lack of an adequate factual
record and because of their deference to federal equal protec-
tion and due process precedents in interpreting similar state
constitutional clauses.5
III. CONCLUSION: A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The issues involved in a referendum zoning case may be
condensed into a four-step analysis:
(1) Is the zoning change a legislative action?
(a) If no, the referendum is inappropriate.
(b) If yes:
(2) Is the municipality subject to state zoning enabling
legislation?
53. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972);
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
54. See, 45 U.S.L.W. 4073 (Jan. 11, 1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
n.12 (1976).
55. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 119 N.J.
Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (1972),'but see Justice Hall's modification of that decision
applying state rather than federal constitutional law, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, 725
(1975).
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(a) If no, the referendum may be appropriate.
(b) If yes:
(3) Are the zoning and referendum procedures
compatible?
(a) If no, the referendum is inappropriate."
(b) If yes, the referendum may be appropriate.
(4) If the referendum procedures are applicable to the re-
zoning process under state law (situations (2)(a) and (3)(b)),
do the procedures as applied and do the results satisfy state
and federal constitutional due process and equal protection
requirements?
(a) If no, the referendum is invalid.
(b) If yes, the referendum is appropriate to the rezoning
situation.
In applying this analysis the court must first determine how
it wishes to classify rezoning actions57 and must apply that
classification scheme to the facts of the case." Secondly, the
court must determine whether the municipality involved is
subject to general state statutes. 9 Thirdly, the court must con-
sider any conflicts between the terms of the particular zoning
statute and the state's referendum laws," bearing in mind the
history of the use of the referendum in the state.6' Broader
56. For an alternate view see City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404
(Fla. 1972).
57. E.g., all rezonings are legislative actions; rezonings implement the zoning plan
and are seldom, if ever, legislative actions; whether or not a rezoning is a legislative
action depends upon its size and/or impact on the community.
58. See, e.g. Allison v. Washington County, 24 Or. App. 571, 548 P.2d 188 (1976)
[comprehensive rezoning subject to referendum].
59. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Contractors' Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205,
529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974).
60. Such elements include the comprehensive planning requirement found in most
zoning acts and whether the referendum laws are procedural or substantive. Other
requirements of the zoning act such as for public hearings and, more particularly, the
veto power of a small percentage of neighbors over a rezoning proposal, unless passed
by extraordinary majority of the City Council, may be superfluous if a referendum can
later defeat the proposed change. To this author, such a situation is a strong indicator
of incompatibility between the statutes.
61. California's entire history demonstrates the repeated use of referendums to
give citizens a voice on questions of public policy. A referendum provision was
included in the first state constitution, . . . and referendums have been a com-
monplace occurrence in the State's active political life.
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971). See also, Lefcoe, The Public Housing
Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1384, 1401 (1971).
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considerations, such as the special nature of the zoning process
and the possible discriminatory effects of referendum zoning,"
may influence a court's analysis of the classification and com-
patibility issues, or may enter into the court's constitutional
analysis. The variety of state positions on these issues and sub-
issues will necessarily affect the results of the analysis and will
lead to different conclusions as to whether, and in what con-
text, referendum zoning is appropriate.
CORNELIA GRIFFIN FARMER
62. See, e.g., Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187,
324 N.E.2d 740 (1975) (Stern, J., concurring), rev'd, City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
